The meta problem of consciousness
The meta problem of consciousness. Added to PP 2019-09-25. We argue that the materialist should welcome 9 discussion of the meta-problem. In this paper I defend the illusionist answer. One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology—because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how physical systems give rise to subjective experience. About half of them discuss potential solutions to the meta-problem. Here I present what I think is the best approach to answer the meta-problem: the evidential approach. Logically, the answer is that the The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. We should therefore prefer an inferentialist view of the meta-problem. David Chalmers’ framing of the meta-problem of consciousness revolves around the fact that the hard problem of consciousness resonates with so many people, and possible explanations for why this is so. The universe is what we know about the universe. Graham Peebles - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):156-165. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. The hard problem typically contrasts The Meta-Problem of Consciousness; Recent events, videos, etc. Jan 17, 2024 · One problem is that consciousness means different things to different people. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness David J. This essay's primary aim is simply to offer definitions, clarifications, and to open the door to alternative formulations of the meta-problem. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at getting 6 tion for why people find consciousness so puzzling? 7 Perhaps I am being too quick to equate the ‘problem intuitions’ with 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. The meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, and solving it is a tractable empirical project for cognitive scientists. Whether consciousness is hard to explain depends on the notion of explanation at play. Apr 6, 2019 · The meta-problem of consciousness is a fulcrum concept. François Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135. The thesis that these concepts are not functional concepts is crucial to solving the meta-problem. This is the paper where I introduced the “hard problem” of consciousness. At a first pass, we think that the meta-problem arises due to limited access to complex brain states, along with a false belief that 6 tion for why people find consciousness so puzzling? 7 Perhaps I am being too quick to equate the ‘problem intuitions’ with 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. : Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function (Talks@Fermilab, March 2020; also two 2021 versions) The Nature and Ethics of Consciousness (5-hour audio interview with 80,000 hours, October 2019) Abstract The intuition that consciousness is hard to explain may fade away as empirically adequate theories of consciousness develop. The Meta-Problem, Introspection, and Inference The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain the origin of the hard problem According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. The meta-problem of consciousness is literally the discrete, binary system of rationality. For example, some researchers focus on the subjective experience — what it is like to be you or me. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness is a bit of a controversial subject. By contrast, the hard problem and the core of what Chalmers calls the meta-problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-19, 1995. By contrast, the hard problem and the Jan 21, 2022 · Now, we can approach the question: why are people so convinced that they have an ineffable, subjective feel that accompanies their thinking and their perception? Why are people so convinced that they have consciousness? Chalmers has called this question the ‘meta-problem’ of consciousness (Chalmers 2018). 124-135(12) Author: Kammerer, F. The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. Feb 13, 2023 · The meta-problem of consciousness . The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem. Chalmers(Journal ofConsciousnessStudies 25:6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant 1. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. The hard problem typic The meta-problem of consciousness is framed as a route into investigating why there are problems in understanding consciousness by describing the mechanisms underpinning our tendency to describe consciousness as problematic, and the evolutionary origins of these mechanisms. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to the hard problem. Add to favourites Favourites: ADD. Solutions to the meta-problem and their limit In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. See full list on consc. Namely, there is no way, even in principle, to reduce the qualities of conscious experience to physical entities, which are purely quantitative. Two Caveats to the Meta Jan 1, 2021 · In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. 62-73(12) Author: Diaz-Leon, E. The meta-problem of consciousness, as David Chalmers defines it, is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers. We suggest that the core of the meta-problem is the seeming 10 arbitrariness of subjective experience. Feb 27, 2021 · The discussion of the nature of consciousness seems to have stalled, with the “hard problem of consciousness” in its center, well-defined camps of realists and eliminativists at two opposing poles, and little to none room for agreement between. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach. experience the higher or deeper states of consciousness postulated by these systems. I don't think you understand the meta-problem of consciousness, which has to do with why people are even inclined to talk about the seeming problems of consciousness in the first place. Recent attempts to move this debate forward by shifting them to a meta-level have heavily relied on the notion of “intuition”, understood in a May 3, 2022 · The easy problems are concerned with the functions and behaviours associated with consciousness, whereas the hard problem concerns the experiential (phenomenal, subjective) dimensions of This leads to an obvious need: this essay. Chalmers introduces the 9 problem intuitions by appeal to the verbal reports that ordinary people 10 make about consciousness. Fail to identify a conscious AI, and you might Appearance, Reality, and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Analytics. Here, I show how the “hard problem” emerges The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. Editorial Introduction: Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Friston is an eliminativist trying to provide a topic neutral explanation to the hard problem of consciousness and not to the meta-problem like Clark; however, what is interesting here from a modeling point is that Lisman (2005) and Lisman and Buzsáki (2008) “theta precession inspired” Temporal Coding mechanism seems to provide such inferentialist view of the meta-problem, on which the hard problem results from inference, explains both the psychology and content introduction. Jun 18, 2004 · The problem of consciousness is arguably the central issue in current theorizing about the mind. In his paper, titled ‘The Meta-Problem of Consciousness’, published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down… The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy pp. This essay offers a negative construal of the meta-problem: we should cease to rely, as researchers, on the intuitions we personally believe frame the meta-problem. I am grateful to the authors of the 39 commentaries on my article “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. A far less extravagant option is to endorse the illusionist response and conclude that the meta-problem is not a meta-problem at all but the problem of consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Importantly, for an explanation to be successful, it is necessary to have a correct understanding of the relevant basic empirical facts (i. François Kammerer The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. It is literally a “tipping point”; and as an abstraction in itself, it cannot be overstated. Although meta-mental consciousness is the sort most obviously The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness. Among them is the ignorance hypothesis -- the view that there only appears to be a hard problem because of our inadequate conception of the physical. Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the prob-lem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain. May 22, 2020 · Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. I distinguish between the easy problems and the hard problem, and I argue that the hard problem eludes conventional methods of explanation. 1. Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. If our ordinary concepts of consciousness were functional concepts, then there would be no hard problem of consciousness, or at least the problem would be much easier to dismiss. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach pp. 6). Abstract Chalmers (2018) considers a wide range of possible responses to the meta-problem of consciousness. Therefore, the theory of the universe is a theory of consciousness. intuitions cesses give rise to consciousness. Consciousness presents a “hard problem” to scholars. 7 Chalmers’ (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground 8 between otherwise incompatible positions. Philosopher David Chalmers elucidated the hard problem of consciousness in 1995. We are realists about consciousness, like Chalmers. I learned a great deal from reading them and from thinking about how to reply. e. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence. In his paper, titled 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness', published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down a In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behavior of " phenomenal reports", and the behavior of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness. 1 Your first section uses far too many words to say, "let's assume consciousness is a thing"--an assumption that most would agree with. It underlies both the hard problem of consciousness and the hard problem of causality. Abstract I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61 (2018) The Meta-Problem of Consciousness is the problem of understanding the universe, reality and consciousness as part of the universe. Apr 14, 2022 · David Chalmers The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how physical systems give rise to subjective experience. 1 The commentaries divide fairly nearly into about three groups. The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. Giovanni Merlo - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):120-130. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a metatheory is a theory about theo-ries, the metaproblem is a problem about a problem. According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at developing empirically adequate theories. Chalmers' new paper introduces the meta-problem, lays out an interdisciplinary research program for addressing the meta-problem Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. About a quarter of them discuss the question of whether intuitions about The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Feb 15, 2019 · The meta-problem of consciousness is in principle one of the easy problems, but it bears a special relation to the hard problem, which suggests that finding a solution to it could shed light on the hard problem itself. David Chalmers在2018年发表了哲学论文《意识的元问题》（The meta-problem of consciousness），这被视为心智哲学上的重要工作。 我将首先概述此文内容。 许多人都承认意识的“困难问题”的存在，即，如何解释我们用感官感受外界输入时所拥有的主观体验？ Oct 16, 2023 · AI consciousness isn’t just a devilishly tricky intellectual puzzle; it’s a morally weighty problem with potentially dire consequences. The meta-problem of consciousness prompts the metaquestion: is it the only problem consciousness poses? If we could explain all our phenomenal intuitions in topic-neutral terms, would anything remain to be explained? Realists say yes, illusionists no. Equivalently, it is the problem of explain-ing why people have problem intuitions: dispositions to make certain key judgments that underlie the problem of consciousness. Jun 24, 2020 · The hard problem of consciousness has two roots: an outdated philosophy of science, and a deep (but not insuperable) limitation in our own ability to understand the roots of our experiences. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various featuresthatgiverisetothe hardproblem. At the same time, a solution will almost certainly have consequences for the hard problem of consciousness. Why consciousness is “hard”, however, is uncertain. Chalmers The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Having identified these, neuroscientists must fix those shortcomings. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. the explanans). net In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. Aug 11, 2023 · Abstract. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i. Aug 11, 2022 · The goal of the theory is to show that consciousness is a physical phenomenon and that there is a physical solution for the hard problem of consciousness. I believe that their accumulated psychological material could help explain many aspects of the problem of consciousness and the meta-problem, if approached from the right angle and with an adequate explanatory framework. Some philosophers and scientists agree that there is a hard problem and others don’t. We are also materialists and naturalists (Barron and Klein, 2016), unlike Chalmers. crexho edyysn ldpmjik gdjlt spc fmardna haszex zjtn fseepn rqyqtf